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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this study is to clarify the prevailing vague 
and sometimes misguided understanding regarding the 
articulation of economic policy, especially in the context of 
socioeconomic systems in structural crisis.The distortions of the 
economic policy are keep reproducing and spreading usually 
because of three disorientating conceptual sources: a) the view 
of economic policy supposedly as a de-ideologized construction, 
or as a de-technicalized voluntarism, b) the view of economic 
policy supposedly as a de-strategized synthesis, c) the view of 
economic policy as a supposedly automatic, ungradated and 
timeless procedure.For a socioeconomic system to exit from its 
crisis and by applying these concepts to the Greek case, we see 
as a prerequisite the interruption of this vicious circle of 
misconceptions, towards the trajectory of a virtuous circle of 
valid understanding the meaning of economic policy. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
All the individual phenomena of the crisis that marked the last 
decade, the stock market shocks of 2008, the governmental bailouts of big 
financial organizations, the recovery of some national GDP growth rates, the 
persistent and constant high rates of unemployment within a lot of national 
economies, they all seem to lead nowadays to an emerging, global status quo 
of a ‘new globalization’ (Adda, 2006; Aglietta, 2010; Boyer, 2015;  
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Chavagneux, 2016; Cohen, 2004; Greenspan, 2008; Grove, 1999; 
Kotler & Caslione, 2009; Laudicina & Peterson, 2016; Naisbitt, 
2006; Naisbitt & Naisbitt, 2010; National Intelligence Council (U.S.), 
2008; Rodrik, 2011; Sapir, 2011; Vlados, Deniozos, & 
Chatzinikolaou, 2018b, 2018a; Βλάδος, 2006, 2017). 
Under these difficult circumstances, the Greek crisis seems far 
from over and it is apparently moving towards a long-term state of 
societal and economic entrapment to feeble growth rates 
(International Monetary Fund. European Dept., 2017). 
On a deeper level of analysis, we think that one of the reasons 
for the painful conservation of the Greek crisis is also the 
existence/reproduction of some misconceptions on what an effective 
anti-crisis economic policy means; and these misconceptions do not 
cease to influence greatly the shaping of the public opinion and the 
public discourse among a great part of the Greek political elites 
(Κατσάμπας, 2017; Κύρτσος, 2017; Φιλίππου, 2012). 
The current dynamics of the restructuring of globalization 
Because of the emerging discipline of the globalization’s 
restructuring crisis there is now a new, pivotal theoretical field that 
reinvigorates all social sciences. In particular, the notion of crisis 
seems progressively as a new conceptual boundary of methodological 
reposition of all social sciences and inside a globalized perspective; 
and this change is simultaneously and cross-disciplinary reflected, 
from modern political science and geopolitics (Ancel, 1936; Carroué, 
2007; Chauprade, 2007; Huntington, 2017; Lacoste, 2006, 2014; 
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Lévy, 2008; Luttwak, 1990; Strange, 1996), to the new ‘thematic 
branches’ of economics (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2004, 
2000; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2009, 2012; Amable, 2005; Berger & 
Dore, 1996; Chang, 2006; Crouch, 2005; D. North, 2005; O. E. 
Williamson, 2000) and from sociology (Abélès, 2008; Beaujard, 
Berger, & Norel, 2009; Carroll, 2010; Colic‐Peisker, 2010; Dufoix, 
2011; Giddens, 1990; Heilbron, Guilhot, & Jeanpierre, 2009; Keck, 
2010; King & Le Galès, 2011; Martel, 2010; Moore, 1966; 
Robertson, 1992) and social psychology to cultural studies (Cuche, 
2013; Gorz, 2003; Hannerz, 1992; Koch & Mattelart, 2016; 
Mattelart, 2009; Mattelart & Neveu, 2010; Noiriel, 2007)1.  
This synthesis of these new approaches shows us that, 
progressively, the global restructuration we are going through can be 
examined as the byproduct of the long process (of approximately 30 
years) of the structural maturation of globalization. After all, as in 
every phase of the evolution of global capitalism (Michalet, 1985; 
Salmon, 2000; St-Onge, 2000; Veltz, 2008), the current one regarding 
the crisis was born as a result of a structural destabilization of the old 
model of development, on a global scale – a destabilization that 
drastically unfolded the last few years, since 2008. This took place 
through the long chain of events set off by the collapse of the 
                                                          
1
 Because, apparently, without a valid understanding of the all-inclusive/ever-
competing global dynamics and crisis, any interpretative attempt of the 
particular contemporary socioeconomic phenomena, regardless of the analytical 
level, can be nothing but insufficient. 
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subprime mortgage loans and spread out everywhere, on all levels of 
our socioeconomic coexistence, on a global scale. Of course, this 
chain did not occur out of nowhere: On the contrary, the crisis first 
took shape on the structural maturation of the previous 
developmental model of globalization (Amsden, 2001; Bairoch, Saint-
Girons, & Asselain, 2005; Krugman, 1992; North, 1990; Perroux, 
1962; Ray, 1998); a structural maturation that has been taking place 
for the last three decades, from the mid-80s to approximately the 
middle of the 2000s. 
So, what we call a crisis of globalization (Abraham-Frois, 2002; 
Aglietta, 1997; Boyer, 1986; Chevalier & Pastré, 2002; Dockès & 
Rosier, 1983, 2002; Kleinknecht, 1986; Lorenzi, Pastré, & Toledano, 
1980; Mandel, 1995; Perez, 2010; Rosier, 1985; Schumpeter, 1939) 
has quite naturally overturned almost everything that we used to take 
as granted, on every level, both nationally and internationally. 
And especially today, the structural overcoming of the crisis 
and the restructuring of the global system seem to require, as an 
absolutely necessary condition, the structuration of economic policies 
that belong to a new logic, in order for our world to enter the path of 
a new, steady model of global development (Aghion, Algan, Cahuc, 
& Shleifer, 2009; Alesina, Favero, & Giavazzi, 2012; Balcerowicz, 
1994; Baum, Checherita-Westphal, & Rother, 2013; Buti, Turrini, & 
Noord, 2014; Eichengreen & Panizza, 2014). 
And this realization, in fact, acquires an even greater meaning 
in the cases of countries with a vulnerable socio-economic structure, 
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especially under internal crisis conditions, like the case of Greece 
nowadays. 
The main interpretative approaches to the Greek crisis 
The Greek crisis was expressed and is still reproduced, while 
continuously being transformed, within an ever-intensifying 
competitive framework and uncertainty that characterizes the current 
global restructuring. Its analysis and interpretation has been 
attempted by many scholars the last few years. Most of these analyses 
focus on the conditions of the individual internal causes of the crisis 
and also on the external conditions of its co-evolution, in the 
changing context of the global environment (Boufounou & Avdi, 
2016; Chalikias, 2017; Cholezas, Kanellopoulos, Mitrakos, & 
Tsakloglou, 2013; Georgievski & Mostert, 2016; Giannitsis & 
Zografakis, 2015; Haliassos, 2015; Kapitsinis, 2018; Kentikelenis, 
2018; Manasse, 2015; Matsaganis, 2013; Mitsakis, 2014; Mitsopoulos 
& Pelagidis, 2009; Petmesidou & Polyzoidis, 2015; Pitelis, 2012). In 
these approaches there is indeed a great variety of overlapping 
interpretative factors and dimensions regarding the Greek crisis. 
More specifically, a great part of these analyses projects mainly 
the financial dimension, regarding basically the Greek crisis as a 
byproduct of the 2007-2009 international financial crisis. Under 
these circumstances, the usual conclusion is that the steep rise of the 
national debt and the unsustainable size of the government deficit are 
the crisis’ epicenter and main source (Christodoulakis, 2010; 
Kuforiji, 2016). 
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Some regard the particularly weak ‘regional’ position of the 
Greek economy within the global system as the interpretative center 
and, accordingly, they observe the Greek crisis as one of the 
‘symptoms’ of the struggling peripheral economies of Europe (Kazemi 
& Sohrabji, 2012; Magoulios & Chouliaras, 2014; Marangos, 2017; 
Mavroudeas, 2014; Mavroudeas, 2016). Some others, with a similar 
reasoning, highlight the poor political management of successive 
Greek governments with their lenders (Hardouvelis & Gkionis, 2016; 
Zettelmeyer, Trebesch, & Gulati, 2013). 
In other approaches, it is the structural inadequacies of the 
Greek economic system both in terms of ‘supply’ and in terms of 
‘demand’ – including the particularly sizable black economy and tax 
evasion – that hold the interpretative primacy (Andreou, 
Andrikopoulos, & Nastopoulos, 2017; Bitzenis, Vlachos, & 
Schneider, 2016; Ioannides & Pissarides, 2015; Triantopoulos & 
Staikouras, 2017). 
There are also those that are focused on the overall problematic 
structure of the politico-economic environment, which, after having 
hatched the crisis, was proven to be incapable of dealing with it, 
mainly due to the preservation and the systematic reproduction of 
clientelism within the Greek public sector (Christopoulou & 
Monastiriotis, 2016; Gkintidis, 2018; Juko, 2010; Koniordos, 2011; 
Rapanos & Kaplanoglou, 2014). Some scholars, in turn, regard this 
overall socio-political inadequacy as the cause for the constant 
resistance against the proposed reforms (Skalkos, 2018). 
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All together, the above approaches cover, in a complementary 
manner, the examination and interpretation of the Greek crisis 
satisfyingly enough. However, one can detect, in a relatively big part 
of them, an inadequacy of deepening their reason towards the 
structural and evolutionary dimension of this crisis (Vlados, 
Deniozos, Chatzinikolaou, & Demertzis, 2018) as well as to the 
examination of the existence and perpetuation of certain conceptual 
misunderstandings, in relation specifically to the endogenous 
restrictions on the structuration of an effective anti-crisis economic 
policy. 
In this paper we focus on this last dimension and specifically on 
the combined reproduction and spread of three kinds of conceptual 
distortion, regarding the structuration of an anti-crisis economic 
policy. In particular: 
 The economic policy either as, supposedly, a de-
ideologized construction or a de-technicalized voluntarism 
 The economic policy as, supposedly, a de-strategized 
synthesis 
 The economic policy as, supposedly, an automatic, 
ungradated, and instant and without ‘friction’ process. 
It is on this matter we consider it useful to attempt some, 
essential in our perspective, critical conceptual clarifications. 
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THE PROBLEM OF THE STRUCTURATION OF A 
MODERN ECONOMIC POLICY IN CONDITIONS OF CRISIS 
According to the classic definition by J. Tinbergen, economic 
policy is the deliberate control of a number of instruments, with the 
purpose of achieving a certain number of targets (Tinbergen, 1956). 
Also, by following the classic line of thought of E.S. Kirschen 
(Kirschen, 1964), economic policy is the economic view on the 
general governmental policy, i.e., the intentional intervention of the 
state in the economic affairs, in order for it to accomplish each time 
certain goals. So, first and basic dimension of the analysis of 
economic policy must always be the clarification and the 
understanding of its specific intentions – its aims. Without clear aims 
there cannot be, ever, real economic policy. 
It is, however, exactly on the issue of the planning and the 
implementation of the aims of economic policy that the following 
crucial matters emerge; matters that seem to have been relatively 
neglected on an interpretative level regarding the negotiation of the 
Greek crisis particularly, but not exclusively. 
The ideological-technical constituents of the structuration of 
modern economic policy 
Overall, economic policy is composed always by decisions (of 
intervention or deliberate abstention from intervention) of the state 
and the organizations depending on it, which have as a main purpose 
the regulation of the conditions of production, distribution or use of 
the resources, as Boissieu specifies (Boissieu, 1980). Accordingly, 
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there are always certain questions arising before the structuration of 
any kind of economic policy: 
 What is the specific economic problem to deal with? A 
question that sets the basis for the formulation of the policy 
framework of objectives and targets. 
 Why is this actually a problem? A question that 
determines the political expediency of dealing with it. 
 Which are the most important causes of the problem? 
A question that sets the boundaries of its theoretical 
examination. 
 What is socially desirable and achievable? A question 
that formulates the content of the means and measures of the 
economic policy. 
Nevertheless, many analyses on the Greek crisis, academic or 
not, seem to have the wrong impression that the structuration of an 
effective economic policy is just a ‘technical’ matter. In other words, 
they express the belief – usually in an indirect way – that there can be 
always ‘only one right solution’ against the crisis, regardless of the 
political environment, the social priorities and any ideological 
parameters (Åslund, 2011; Buiter & Rahbari, 2011; Carfi & Schiliro, 
2012; European Commission, 2010; Featherstone, 2011; Glynos & 
Voutyras, 2016; Hughes, 2011; Katsimi & Moutos, 2010; Kouretas & 
Vlamis, 2010; Koutsoukis & Roukanas, 2011; Mourmouras, 
Ivvanova, Anayotos, & Mayer, 2003; Terzi, 2015; Tsoulfidis, Alexiou, 
& Tsaliki, 2016). 
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And of course this is not true, as economic policy, on every 
level of analysis, is always a byproduct of both the ‘positive’ and the 
‘normative’ dimensions of Economics (Jelveh, Kogut, & Naidu, 2015; 
Pelikán & Wegner, 2003)2. In reality, the agents of economic policy, 
no matter how much they refer to their ‘objective view’, always set 
specific objectives that occur from their normative judgments and 
incorporate their ideological and political preferences and priorities. 
This way, economic policy is always a complex and difficultly divisible 
mixture of both ‘normative’ and ‘positive’ constituents: 
 On the one hand, there is the part of economic policy 
that refers to the economic-quantitative mapping of the 
objectives, to the predictions of their effects and to their 
measurements; the ‘positive’ economics. 
 On the other, there is the part of economic policy that 
refers to what are the desired objectives, targets and means of 
the policy; the ‘normative’ economics. 
                                                          
2
 Specifically, as it is already known, economic theory is characterized as 
‘positive’ when it investigates a situation approaching the ‘is’, the ‘was’ or the 
‘would be, if’; i.e., when it explores, discovers and describes the relation among 
certain economic phenomena and figures, a relation that can be checked 
empirically. This, we can say it is the ‘technical’, the ‘objective’ part of it. On the 
contrary, economic theory is characterized as ‘normative’, when it approaches a 
situation under the light of ‘ought to be’ or ‘what we ought to do’; i.e., in this 
part, the theory depends on and is affected by values and by the ideological 
beliefs on what is desirable and what is not. And, let us not forget, the 
differences regarding different moral propositions cannot be solved by 
considering solely the empirical data, as they are never a matter of ‘pure data’ 
but a matter of interpreting them. 
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What always emerges in practice as an anti-crisis economic 
policy can only be a technical-ideological mixture, in the specific 
conditions posed by the dynamic evolution of the global system 
(Krishna, 1988; Nelson & Sheffrin, 1991; Stilwell, 2011; Thompson 
& Hickson, 2001) (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Economic policy as a technical-ideological mixture 
 
 
Therefore, the anti-crisis economic policy in Greece could only 
have an indivisible mixed technical-ideological character as well 
(Βαβούρας, 2005)3. 
We believe, of course, that it is unsound and ineffective either 
the absolute ‘positivizing’ or the absolute ‘normatizing’ of any kind of 
                                                          
3
 The discrimination between positive and normative economics is useful 
regarding the origins of differences in matters of economic policy, even today. It 
is important to understand on what degree are the occurred differences a result 
of different normative judgments, thus of different evaluations on the objectives 
or the means to be adopted, or a result of different evaluations on the 
measurements or the effects of the objectives or of the means of the economic 
policy. 
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economic policy4. On the contrary, we must accept the constantly 
‘mixed character’ of economic policy, without, however, neglecting 
the individual components: technical and ideological. Economic 
policy must be perceived, without illusions, as a ‘scientific’ and a 
‘moral’ entity at the same time; in other words, as we will see later on, 
as a ‘strategic’ view and action. 
Meanwhile, the superficial approach to the understanding of 
the formulation of economic policy is very often based on the 
assumption that the basic aim of those that exercise it (as if they were 
a completely homogeneous group, something that of course can never 
happen) is the maximization of a given and indubitable social welfare 
function, within the limitations set by the structures of the related 
economic system. But, in reality, those who exercise economic policy 
usually avoid the strict determination of specific desired figures of the 
targets and means they possess (Simon, 1947). 
Furthermore, those who exercise economic policy, more often, 
do not aim so much for the simultaneous achievement of all their 
targets, as they focus mostly on achieving only one (or a small number 
of similar and complementary targets) that are regarded as more 
important and of which the ‘present figure’ is considered 
unsatisfying. Then, they channel towards that target the greatest part 
of the available resources and means and right after, since this central 
                                                          
4
 And according to J.K. Galbraith (Galbraith, 1987) economics is not useful when 
it exists separated from politics. Separating economics from politics and political 
motives is something sterile. 
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target has been achieved to a ‘satisfying degree’, they turn their 
attention and available means to the next targets of their political 
agenda. 
In this way, the general aims of economic policy, regarding also 
the structuration of anti-crisis policy, can only be characterized by 
their mixed – technical and ideological – content: 
 They concern the ‘generally desirable’ economic and 
social directions, towards which the specific followed 
governmental policy is each time oriented. 
 They incorporate, in a direct or indirect way, the 
central ideological as well as the managerial priorities followed 
by the government. 
 They have, to a certain degree and according to each 
case, a totalizing and visionary content and they are not 
initially expressed in specific quantitative terms. 
 They are based on and make use of, to a degree, the 
data provided by empirical reality and they use, also to a 
degree, methods of their scientific analysis. 
 They express, directly or indirectly, the moral status 
quo of society and of the ‘dominant pole’ of the political 
system as well as the ideological directions of political elites. 
 They compose the economic and social variables, thus 
creating the welfare function which the – always specific in 
space and time – economic policy tries to maximize. 
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In practice, the above assertions remain unclear and 
incomprehensible for the Greek public opinion and for many agents 
that express and exercise politics in Greece. Specifically, we do not 
cease to detect the spread of various simplistic illusions. To be 
effective, the structuration of anti-crisis economic policy should be 
neither ‘de-politicized’ 5  nor ‘de-technicalized’ 6 ; and these are 
conceptual misunderstandings that go on and keep spreading by 
various media that shape the public opinion, and with particularly 
negative political effects in the case of Greek crisis (Alcidi & Gros, 
2012; Σαβούρδου, 2018; Τσιπλάκος, 2016). 
Economic policy as confrontational strategy in the context of 
the politico-economic cycle 
As an immediate derivative of the previous relatively 
widespread misunderstandings, very often emerges the attempt of a 
conceptual ‘de-strategizing’ of economic policy, in the sense that some 
try to present it as potentially independent and autonomized from 
the specific structures and dynamics of the internal and external 
environment, inside of which the policy is structured, implemented 
and controlled (Monastiriotis & Antoniades, 2009; Pappas, 2013; 
Triandafyllidou, 2009). 
                                                          
5
 A program of ‘sheer’ technocrats with the simultaneous halt of any kind of 
political claiming is never a case. 
6
 On the direction of an extreme political voluntarism: The logic of ‘people before 
the numbers’. 
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On the contrary, we believe it must be understood that always 
the structuration of economic policy is the byproduct of a 
confrontational strategic process. It sets, directly or indirectly, a 
vision, it has objectives, it has agents and actors, it has an external 
environment, it has conflicting alternatives and it also has ‘customers’ 
– the citizens that validate it, or not, by voting. 
In this interpretative perspective, after all, belongs also the 
classic model of the politico-economic cycle by B.S. Frey (Frey, 1978), 
which we consider to be very useful for perceiving the structuration of 
anti-crisis economic policy as a confrontational strategic process. The 
specific politico-economic model of analysis studies the mutual 
influence between the political and the economic sector of society, by 
focusing on the relation between the consumer-voter and the 
government. In particular, the basic concept of the model recognizes 
two factors of action, voters and government, and two cycles of 
action, economic and political. It is based, at the same time, on two 
distinguished mechanisms: 
 The voters evaluate the performance of the 
government 
 The government seeks ways to manage the economy in 
order to remain in power and to maximize its usefulness. 
So, the influence of the economy on the political institutions is 
expressed by an evaluation function, while the influence of the state 
on the economic institutions by a politics function. By examining 
Frey’s model, we distinguish four main structural elements: 
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i. Voters: We consider them to be ‘logical’; they take 
into account the government’s past and the expected 
governmental performance in regard to the state of the 
economy. Of course, there are widely divergent views on how 
fast voters anticipate the government’s performance based on 
its past and whether they ‘remember’. 
ii. Government: We consider it to act as a whole and 
rationally; it maximizes its usefulness by identifying its 
ideological targets and under limitations: ideological, 
managerial and economic. 
iii. Political sector: Here we are mainly interested in 
parliamentary democracies and examine a two-way question; 
‘is the economy being led by the elections or the elections are 
determined by the course of the economy?’ 
iv. Economic sector: Many models cover a specific part of 
economy and mostly inflation and unemployment, but very 
few reflect the link between the evolution of the economy and 
the political process. 
In this theoretical orientation we believe we can perceive with 
greater clarity the economic policy as a strategic-political process 
(Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: The political process in the structuration of economic 
policy 
 
 
In this interpretative perspective it becomes easily clear that 
state policy in general – and, more specifically, economic policy as 
one of its main ingredients – is always a product of strategic 
procedures. And of course there is no ‘objectively perfect’ policy, 
regardless of its particular socioeconomic content, the specific space 
and time frame and its specific strategic aiming. Although it is the so 
called neutral aim of ‘public interest’ or ‘common welfare’ that is 
often presented as the basic goal of economic policy, we ought to 
understand that, always, every state/economic policy has its own, 
particular politico-confrontational content: thus, it is itself a strategic 
creation (Clausewitz, 1832; Kaplan & Norton, 2004; Kim & 
Mauborgne, 2015; Machiavelli, 1532). 
In this way, the challenge for the structuration of economic 
policy becomes purely of strategic-political nature and can be simply 
put by the following question: ‘Which alternative policy shall I follow 
under the specific socio-political conditions and at what political 
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benefits and costs?’ And here, in the structuration of a systematic 
economic policy, the agent of planning and action ought to study the 
evolution of the related external environment (socioeconomic system) 
as well as the potential of the related internal environment 
(government-state system), by calculating the possible opportunities 
and threats – that are born by the change of the agent’s overall 
external, national, international and global environment – and by 
trying to make use of the agent’s comparative strong points and to 
protect the comparatively weak ones. 
In this conceptual direction, we believe that an anti-crisis 
economic policy could be ‘demystified’ in the eyes of a big number of 
citizens and politicians in Greece today: The anti-crisis economic 
policy is not an ‘axiom’, it is not an ‘all-weather’ solution, it must be 
always a ‘down to earth’ strategy with clear boundaries, as an exercise 
of realism and dynamic balance. 
Objectives, targets, kinds, means and time-lags in the 
structuration of economic policy 
A third misconception on the anti-crisis economic policy 
regards the widespread wrong belief that economic policy can be 
supposedly produced and implemented ‘automatically’, without 
hierarchies and priorities, within an environment of no ‘attritions’ 
and delays (Edsall, 2012; Martins, 2011; Mehta, 2013). 
Economic policy gets full meaning only as long as it manages to 
give specific answers to the ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘in what time frame’ 
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questions. Therefore, any ungradated and timeless perception of 
economic policy is deeply misleading. 
In particular, in order to understand the meaning of economic 
policy, we must clarify primarily the specific concept of its objectives 
and targets. According to the traditional definition by E.S. Kirschen, 
the objectives of economic policy can be nothing but ‘economic 
translations’ of the general political aims into concepts that can be 
quantified (Kirschen, 1964). More specifically and also according to 
K.E. Boulding, an objective in economic policy is always one of the 
variables describing the economic system and it is considered an 
‘important’ variable in the sense that the increase or decrease of its 
quantity defines whether the system will improve or get worsen 
(Boulding, 1958). 
So, each objective of economic policy refers to a specific and 
measurable aim of the agents of economic policy and defines a 
quantitative criterion of the policy’s success. An objective can 
contribute to the cover of more than one general aims of economic 
policy. On the other hand, targets are in particular the individual, 
quantified, timed, sectorally and geographically focused results to be 
achieved for the objective of economic policy to be covered (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3: General aims, objectives and targets of Economic 
Policy 
 
 
So, any confusion among the political vision, the objectives and 
the targets of the policy becomes particularly detrimental, on the 
degree that the agent who plans and exercises economic policy seeks 
more clarity in the underlying strategic plan. Also, we believe that 
there is a particularly clarifying distinction among the means of 
economic policy, on the basis of their nature. We can practically 
distinguish them in three basic kinds: 
 Economic figures-quantities: Their changes, as 
independent variables, do not affect the structure and the 
bases of the economic system7. 
                                                          
7
 E.g.: Taxes, government expenditure, quantity of money, social security 
contributions, interest rates, fractional-reserve banking etc. 
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 Institutions: These means have a qualitative character; 
they change some structural elements of the socioeconomic 
system, but without changing radically its basic structure and 
fundamental elements8. 
 Reforms: These means lead to radical qualitative 
restructurings, affect drastically the structure of the 
socioeconomic system and influence its structural foundations 
and its basic developmental orientations, in the context of 
global dynamics (Bates & Krueger, 1993; Bluhm, 
Crombrugghe, & Szirmai, 2014; Bouis, Causa, Demmou, 
Duval, & Zdzienicka, 2012; Drazen & Grilli, 1993; Hill, 
2013)9 (Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Qualitative and quantitative measures in Economic 
Policy 
 
                                                          
8
 E.g.: Regulations regarding occupational closure, conditions of employment, 
license granting, investments etc. 
9
 E.g.: Deep structural changes of taxation, monetary system, social security, 
branches of economic activity etc. 
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In this sense, under no circumstances should we maintain the 
wrong impression that all ‘medicines’ proposed by economic policy 
can have the same effect on the ‘patient’-economic system and, 
consequently, under no circumstances should we expect from simple 
quantitative-conjunctural measures to redeploy the deeper 
developmental model of our socioeconomic system in qualitative 
terms; as unfortunately the Greek public opinion often seems to 
accept (Moschonas, 2016). 
In particular, for the development of an effective economic 
policy, we ought to always understand the essential differences 
between a conjunctural and a structural economic policy (Clark, 
1940; Kuczynski & Williamson, 2003; Leon, 1967; Williamson, 
2005). 
 The conjunctural economic policy includes short-term 
targets relating to the current economic situation 
(conjuncture); it regards a short-term period, the present and 
near future. 
 The structural economic policy is composed by long-
term targets of politics; these targets regard the 
structural/institutional aims of economic policy and long-
term periods, of at least ten years. 
Of course, there must always be a clarification concerning the 
connection between conjunctural and structural economic policy. In 
practice, they are tightly connected, but they should not be confused 
with each other nor should the one substitute the other. The 
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conjunctural, aiming for temporary conditions of stability, creates the 
basis needed for the successful exercising of structural policy. But 
conjunctural policy cannot secure on its own a long-term success of 
any economic policy, as several analysts continue to claim in the case 
of the Greek crisis. The corrective-structural modernization of a 
socioeconomic system can occur only through a consistent, cohesive 
and stable structural policy. 
Furthermore, there should always be interest in the 
examination of time-lags (Alt & Woolley, 1982; Golder, 2010; 
Masciandaro & Suardi, 2014; Singh, 2010; Tepe & Vanhuysse, 2010) 
characterizing every economic policy. Economic policy is of course 
never implemented in conditions of ‘zero attrition’ nor does it take 
place timelessly and automatically. On the contrary, it always faces 
time-lags and we can distinguish two particular kinds of these lags: 
 Internal time-lag 
 External time-lag.  
Specifically, internal time-lag can be directly affected by the 
agents of policy, on the measure of their managerial abilities. This 
time-lag refers to the time elapsing between the moment the need for 
measures is perceived – in order for the gap between the actual and 
the desired figures and targets of the economic policy to be covered – 
and the moment the agents of the policy take the allegedly necessary 
corrective measures. Internal time-lag is divided into: 
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 Lag of recognition; i.e., the time required for the 
agents of policy to recognize the need for measures, which will 
correct the up to date policy. 
 Lag of decision; i.e., the time required for necessary 
decisions regarding the corrective measures to be made by the 
agents of economic policy. 
 Lag of management; i.e., the time required for 
decisions changing the currently implemented policy. 
The external time-lag, on the contrary, cannot be directly 
affected by the agents of policy. This time-lag refers to the time 
elapsing between the moment of implementing the corrective 
measures and the moment they completely exhaust their effects on 
the figures of the targets of economic policy. External time-lag is 
usually divided into: 
 Time-lag of influence on intermediate variables of 
policy10. 
 Time-lag of the final variables or targets of policy11. 
Therefore, what is of great importance regarding the 
effectiveness of every economic policy is the effort of its agent, firstly, 
to reduce the internal time-lags that concern his own strategic 
implementation, by rearranging and enhancing his internal strategic 
                                                          
10
E.g.: The time elapsing between a change in income tax rate and the influence 
on aggregate demand. 
11
E.g.: The time elapsing between a change in aggregate demand and the change 
in the level of aggregate employment, if we assume that the latter is the target 
of the implemented policy. 
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and managerial forces, and, secondly, to predict relatively accurately 
the external lags in order to have no illusions regarding the time 
needed for his strategy to pay off. As far as Greece is concerned, 
dealing with time-lags is a ‘traditional’ weakness of the Greek 
economic policy-making. 
Overall, we believe all these theoretical notes to be very 
important to the effort of ‘demystifying’ the anti-crisis economic 
policy needed for Greece, during the time when a large part of our 
fellow citizens and of those in power continue to seek some ‘perfect’ 
policies in measures that are fragmentary, occasional and ‘spineless’ 
and, in fact, to anticipate in vain the immediate implementation and 
fruition of these measures (Schmidt, 2015; Λιάκος, 2010; 
Παπαδόπουλος, 2017). 
CONCLUSION: BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF 
MISCONCEPTIONS 
To sum up our conclusions, we believe that an important factor 
of restraint regarding Greece’s effort of overcoming the crisis is the 
constant activation of a ‘vicious circle’ of misunderstandings on the 
very concept of the anti-crisis economic policy; by a great part of both 
the citizens and the political leaders of the country. And each link on 
this circle prescribes the production and strengthening of the next 
circle in row, after having been produced and strengthened by the 
misunderstandings of the previous one (Figure 5). 
 
 
Journal of 
Governance And 
Public Policy 
 
 
 
308 
Figure 5: The vicious circle of the wrong perception of 
economic policy in conditions of crisis 
 
Specifically, in practice, the perception of economic policy 
either as a de-ideologized construction or as a figment of a supposedly 
completely de-technicalized voluntarism has fed and continues to feed 
political illusions; illusions of the type ‘everything is numbers and 
have one single interpretation’ or ‘numbers are unnecessary and 
everything is a matter of decision’. 
Next, the relevant perception of economic policy articulation as 
a de-strategized synthesis – supposedly autonomized and independent 
from the requirements and limits of the internal and external 
conditions – reproduces a spirit of imbalance that, through its lacking 
of realism, undermines any substantial effort towards creating and 
implementing a viable anti-crisis strategy. 
Lastly, the erroneous perception of economic policy as a 
supposedly automatic, ungradated and timeless process does not 
cease to feed the illusions that seek the way out of the crisis in 
fragmentary, superficial and short-term measures 
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